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A bstract
The Economic and M onetary Union (EMU) implies a considerable change in mon­
etary  and fiscal policy design in the European Union. W ith  the aid of a two-country 
version of the Alesina and Tabellini (1987) model, this paper provides a stylized analysis 
of m onetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU. It is shown how macroeconomic 
outcomes are affected by common m onetary and fiscal policies and how outcomes depend 
on the com m itm ent ability of the ECB when im plem enting its m onetary policy. More­
over, it is analyzed how asymm etries between countries affect outcomes when entering 
EMU.
Key-words: EMU, ECB, M onetary Policy, Fiscal Policy 
JEL-code: E24, E58, E62, E63 
February 1998
1. D epartm ent of Applied Economics (5.01.34), University of Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9108, 
6500 HK Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
2. Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Université des Sciences et Technologies 
de Lille, 59655 Villeneuve d ’Asq Cedex, France.
We like to  thank  David van Hoose, Jan  Fidrm uc and two anonymous referees whose 
comments made it possible to  improve our analysis significantly upon earlier versions. 
Necessarily, the usual disclaimer applies. A part of the paper was constructed when the 
first au thor stayed at the Center for Economic Studies of the University of Munich. Its 
support and hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
1
In tr o d u c t io n
The countries of the European Union (EU) th a t will join the Economic and Mone­
tary  Union (EMU) will delegate the design of m onetary policy from the former national 
central banks to  the new common, European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, w ith the 
proceeding of economic integration also the efforts to  increase fiscal convergence and 
integration have gained im portance. The M aastricht Treaty of 1991 on EMU provides 
a blueprint for the establishm ent of a m onetary union in the EU and a framework for 
fiscal integration, harm onization and convergence in the EU. EMU, therefore, implies a 
considerable change in the design and interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy in the 
EU. This paper investigates the design and interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy in 
a m onetary union and analyzes how the establishm ent of a m onetary and fiscal union 
might affect macroeconomic variables.
We consider different policy regimes and focus upon the ou tpu t and inflation per­
formance and fiscal variables in the different regimes. S tarting point is a setting w ith 
national autonom y in bo th  m onetary and fiscal policy. This setup is a stylized represen­
ta tion  of the pre-EM U situation. Next, we analyze a setting where countries decide to  
replace national m onetary autonom y and to  form a m onetary union w ith  a centralized 
m onetary authority, the ECB, th a t controls the supply of the common currency, the 
Euro. We first consider outcomes when national fiscal autonom y remains. We compare 
outcomes under a regime where the ECB can commit its m onetary policies towards the 
private sector w ith the case where it cannot do so. In  the first case the ECB can be 
considered as having a high degree of independence whereas in the second case it has 
been unable to  achieve a clear degree of independence. From this perspective, this paper 
complements earlier studies on ECB m onetary policy and economic performance in the 
EMU by Alesina and Grilli (1993), von Hagen and Siippel (1994) and M artin  (1995) 
th a t have been carried out in the context of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model.
Finally, a setting is considered where also national fiscal autonom y vanishes and 
national fiscal authorities are replaced by a federal fiscal au thority  th a t controls taxation  
in the EU. W hile fiscal autonom y is still high at the s ta rt of the EMU, it is conceivable 
th a t in the EU federal fiscal policies will become increasingly im portan t in the future. 
The European Commission (1993) studied in detail such fiscal federalism dimensions of 
the EMU. In our stylized representation of an EU w ith federal taxation  and government 
spending, the federal fiscal authorities decide upon taxation  in the EU. Fiscal transfers 
enable to  redistribute resources in the EU to  stim ulate development in stagnating parts or 
more generally to  prom ote any other policy goal th a t requires redistribution of resources.
To analyze the interaction of m onetary and fiscal policies under EMU, the model 
of m onetary and fiscal policy interaction of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) is extended 
to  a two-country m onetary union setting. In this m anner more insight results on the 
interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy under EMU. The versatility of the approach by 
Alesina and Tabellini witnesses also a num ber of recent studies th a t extend the analysis to  
a two-country setting, van Hoose (1992) studies the institu tional setting of a two-country 
European M onetary System (EMS). Agell et.al. (1996) study exchange ra te  and fiscal 
policy discretion and com m itm ent in a small country th a t participates in a m anaged 
exchange ra te  system  like the EMS. In addition it is shown how binding borrowing 
constraint -such as the one imposed by the M aastricht Treaty- affect the outcomes. 
M artin  (1995) models a two-speed m onetary union in which one country initially is 
outside EMU because it has positive inflation and ou tpu t targets tha t, however, gradually 
converge to  those of the EMU countries. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) study the effects 
of EMU on the interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy. Banerjee (1997) studies in detail 
the interaction of national fiscal authorities and the ECB and considers a large num ber
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of alternative EMU scenarios.
O ur paper aims to  complement these studies and focuses on a few aspects of EMU 
th a t have been left unexplored or not studied in full detail earlier. It remains more 
closely to  the original framework as pioneered by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and van 
Hoose (1992) th an  the other studies m entioned who all extended the original w ith ad­
ditional features, interactions and mechanisms. W hile interesting and certainly relevant 
such extensions necessarily complicate these analyses significantly and require a t some 
point a compromise between simplicity and transparency -as inherent in the original 
framework- and relevance. O ur analysis adds two innovations to  the existing literature. 
F irst, we consider the consequences of fiscal unification under EMU when the countries 
th a t form a m onetary union decide to  centralize also fiscal policy. In this m anner the 
analysis contributes -in a stylized m anner albeit- to  the recurrent debates on the need 
to  harmonize tax  systems and fiscal policies and to  develop federal fiscal policies in the 
EU. Second, the effects of some asymmetries between the countries th a t form a mon­
etary  union are analyzed. Two possible asymmetries are focused upon: (i) differences 
of com m itm ent ability of the former national m onetary authorities, (ii) differences in 
fiscal preferences. The implications of these asymm etries th a t bear also relevance in the 
context of the EMU, are studied in section 5.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 extends the Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987) closed-economy model to  a two-country setting w ith national autonom y in mon­
etary  and fiscal policy design. Section 3 analyzes outcomes when the countries decide 
to  form a m onetary union and compares the outcomes under EMU w ith the outcomes 
under national m onetary policy as derived in section 2. Section 4 introduces fiscal fed­
eralism  in the EMU and considers its effects on macroeconomic performance. In section 
5 we consider the effects of s tructural asymmetries between the countries th a t decide to  
enter the EMU. A short conclusion summarizes our m ain results.
2. N a t io n a l A u to n o m y  in  M o n e ta r y  a n d  F isc a l P o lic y  D e s ig n
To study the interaction between m onetary and fiscal policy in the EMU, we extend 
the elegant framework of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) to  a two-country EU. The Alesina 
and Tabellini (1987) analysis studies the interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy in the 
context of a closed economy. It is shown how output, inflation and taxation  are the 
outcome of the interaction between the m onetary authority, who determines the ra te  of 
inflation, the fiscal authority, who controls (distortionary) taxation  of private sector out­
put, and the private sector w ith a centralized trade union th a t sets the nom inal wage. 
A distinction is made between two equilibria: in the equilibrium  w ith discretionary 
m onetary policy the m onetary player is unable to  credibly commit its policy towards 
the private sector. In  the com m itm ent equilibrium, on the other hand, the m onetary 
authority  is able to  commit its m onetary policy.
S tarting point of our analysis is the pre-EM U situation w ith national currencies and 
national m onetary policy autonom y1. Consider an EU th a t consists of two parts or 
countries whose relative sizes (e.g. in term s of trend  output) are given by 7  and 1 — 7  , 
respectively. As in Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and van Hoose (1992), output, y, which 
is taxed at a rate  r ,  is produced by com petitive firms th a t use labor input as the sole 
variable input in the production process. W ith  capital being fixed, aggregate supply in
1 Alternatively, we could interpret this regime as representing a two-speed m onetary union that consists 
of a core and a peripheral part of the EU. A  two-speed m onetary union in which EU countries retain 
national m onetary policy autonom y but engage in a process of m onetary and economic convergence has 
been proposed by a number of econom ists and politicians as an alternative to  a too rapid unification  
process that may prove unsustainable in the long run.
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th a t case is a function of relative real unit labor costs2,
y  =  a ( p  — w  — t ) ( la )
y* =  a ( p * _ w* _ r *) ,  (lb )
in which p,  denotes the output price level and w  the nom inal wage. Variables are in 
logarithm s and refer to  deviations from the initial equilibrium  where output is a t its 
na tu ra l ra te  and which has been normalized to  zero for convenience. Foreign variables 
are indicated w ith an asterisk.
Nominal wages in bo th  countries are set by national trade  unions th a t try  to  mini­
mize deviations of real wages from their real wage targets and uj and uj* ,
r m n wV T =  — (w  — p  — uj)2 (2a)
m inu.,V T* =  i ( w * - p * - uj*)2 . (2b)
Losses, therefore, are minimized if,
w  =  p e +  oj (3a)
w * =  p *e +  q * . (3b)
in which the superscript e refers to  the expectation of a variable.
Defining the inflation rates as, 7r =  ^  and 7r* =  ou tpu t in bo th  countries can 
also be w ritten  as a function of inflation rates,
y  =  a(7r — 7Te — t  — uj) (4a)
y* =  a(7T* -7 T* e - T *  -  UJ*) . (4b)
(4) shows two im portant sources of unemployment in the model: firstly, real wage claims 
by the trade unions, implying uj >  0, drive a wedge between real wages and productivity 
of labor and output below the (zero) equilibrium level of ou tput. Secondly, also high taxes 
drive down ou tpu t and increase unemployment. Note th a t the inflation rates in both  
countries are linked by the assum ption of purchasing power parity, according to  which 
the inflation differential equals the ra te  of depreciation, x ,  implying th a t x  =  tt — tt* .
In  the absence of government deb t3, government expenditures are financed by or­
dinary taxes and seignorage revenues. The government budget constraint equates gov­
ernm ent spending, G, w ith  ordinary taxes, T, plus seignorage revenues, M  =  th a t 
the central bank receives when increasing the supply of base money, M ,  in the economy. 
Expressed as fractions of domestic output, Y ,  the government budget constraints read,
G T  M  , r ,
— = -----1-----  (5a)Y  Y  Y  v ’
G* T* M*
—  = ------ 1-------• (5b)Y* y * Y*
2See also Alesina and Tabellini (1987). Both countries are assumed to  have access to  the same 
production technologies, resulting in sym m etric values for a.  Relaxing this assum ption would complicate 
considerably the analytical expressions in the remainder, w ithout producing further insights.
3As Alesina and Tabellini (1987), our analysis ignores the intertemporal dim ension of the government 
budget im plied by government debt. The absence of government debt can alternatively be interpreted 
as a situation where policymakers w ish to  raise an amount of g of government expenditures in the form 
of either taxes or seignorage. See van Aarle, Bovenberg and R aith (1997) for the interaction between  
the ECB and national fiscal authorities and the problem of government debt stabilization under EM U.
4
Approxim ating -as in Alesina and Tabellini (1987)- seignorage revenues as fraction of 
ou tpu t by the rate  of inflation, and defining the government expenditures to output, 
g = y ,  and taxes to  output, r  =  y ,  ratios, we can rewrite (5) as,
g = t  +  7r (6a)
g* = T* +  7T* . (6b)
The fiscal authorities in bo th  countries set the tax  ra te  so as to  minimize their loss 
functions th a t are assumed to  depend on inflation, ou tput, and deviations of government 
spending from their exogenously given target values, g and g*,
m m r V F = ^ { tt2 +  <5iy2 + S2(g -  g)2} (7a)
YaiYiT* V F * =  i{vr*2 +  6*lV*2 +  6*2(g* -  g*?}  • (7b)
Government expenditures are determ ined residually from the government budget con­
straints, defined in (6). Because the fiscal authorities are subject to  electoral discipline, 
we assume in the rem ainder of the analysis th a t the preferences of the fiscal authorities in 
(7) also reflect the underlying social preferences. We also consider similar loss functions 
for the national m onetary authorities,
min7ry M =  ^{vr2 + m y 2 + ^ ( g  -  g f }  (8a)
m in ^ U M* =  ^{K*2 + uly*2 + ^ ( g *  -  g*)2} . (8b)
We assume th a t the fiscal authorities care relatively more about ou tpu t stabilization 
and the fiscal spending objective th an  the m onetary authorities, implying th a t 8\ >  /¿i,
>  //.J, 2^ >  /U2 and ¿2 ^  ¿¿2-
We derive the reaction functions of the fiscal authorities and m onetary authorities in 
bo th  countries by minimizing the loss functions of the m onetary and fiscal authorities 
subject to  the respective ou tpu t (4) and government budget (6) constraints. Using the 
rates of inflation and taxation  th a t result, we derive ou tpu t and government spending 
and which are given in Table la ,
Table la
Outcomes w ith N ational M onetary Policies: M onetary Policy Com m itment 
C ountry 1
9 - 9 =  gia2(i+£2)+g2 (P +  9) 
v = - ^ { 9 - g )
7T =  ^ ( g  -  g)
T = - u  + ^ ( g - g )
C ountry 2
s '  - S '  =  e; ^ iS1' f , . H e y + S ' )
V - = - l o i r s ' -  S -)
,r * = M j ( r - S - )
+ j M y  -  s’ )
The inflation rates in Table la  were derived under the assum ption th a t the m onetary 
authorities were able to  credibly commit ex ante their m onetary policies towards the
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private sector. M onetary policy, however, is in principal subject to  a time-inconsistency 
problem  because the m onetary authority  is tem pted to  increase ou tpu t by creating an 
unanticipated  increase in the ra te  of inflation after wage contracts have been signed. The 
private sector when realizing this time-inconsistency problem  will adjust its inflationary 
expectations such as to  internalize this time-inconsistency problem  in their decision mak­
ing process. W ith  rational economic agents, the tim e-inconsistency problem, therefore, 
gives rise to  an inflationary bias in the economy in case the m onetary authority  is unable 
to  commit towards the private sector. Rogoff (1985) showed th a t conservative central 
bankers th a t a ttribu te  low value to  ou tpu t stabilization, i.e. th a t have a low /¿i, on 
the one hand, improve welfare as conservativeness alleviates the inflationary bias in the 
economy. On the other hand, in the presence of random  ou tpu t shocks some flexibility 
is efficient and a too conservative Central Bank produces inefficient outcom es4. Table 
lb gives inflation, taxation, government spending and outpu t under m onetary policy 
discretion in bo th  countries,
Table lb
Outcomes w ith  N ational M onetary Policies: M onetary Policy Discretion
C ountry 1
9 - 9  =  r , f1 , +  9).51 aH (1+ju 2 + ) + ¿ 2
y  =  ~ s f ^ ( 9 - 9 )
vr =  {¡12 + ^ ) ( g  -  g)
T =  - p  +  ^ { 9 - g )
C ountry 2
9* ~ 9 * =  , 2, +  9*)
si a
y* = - ^ ( g * - g * )  * 
vr * =  { r t  +  Ej ^ ) { r - g * )
T* =  - " *  +  - $ ? ( r - g * ) ___________
B oth under m onetary policy com m itm ent (Table la) and m onetary policy discretion 
(Table lb ), we see th a t government spending is below its target. Moreover, output, 
inflation, taxes, the rate  of depreciation and welfare losses are all directly related to  
the deviation of government spending from its target. Com paring Table la  and lb  we 
find the first of the two m ain results from the Alesina and Tabellini (1987) analysis: 
inflation, ou tput and government spending are higher and taxes are lower under discre­
tionary m onetary policies th an  under m onetary policy com m itm ent. The higher rate  
of inflation under m onetary policy discretion implies higher seignorage revenues th a t 
can be used to  increase government spending and to  lower taxes th a t on their tu rn  in­
crease ou tput. From an initial position where <5* =  i = {1,2}, welfare losses are 
lower under m onetary policy comm itm ent th an  under m onetary policy discretion, be­
cause the positive welfare effect from lower inflation dom inates the negative effects from
4In addition, as first argued by Jensen (1992), also the fiscal authority may face a tim e-inconsistency  
problem in the present setup because unanticipated tax  cuts increase output. Fiscal policy discretion  
therefore produces lower taxes, lower government spending and higher inflation while output is not 
affected ex post. Our analysis ignores the fiscal tim e-inconsistency problem and focuses on the time- 
inconsistency problem of the monetary authorities. Implicitly, we assume that the fiscal authorities 
always succeed in im plem enting their policies w ith  com m itm ent. Banerjee (1997) studies m onetary and 
fiscal policy discretion and com m itm ent in the EM U and shows how outcom es are affected when consid­
ering different assum ptions about the abilities of m onetary and fiscal authorities to  com m it m onetary 
and fiscal policies towards the private sector
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lower government spending and lower output. W hen lowering the values of however, 
a t some point welfare under m onetary policy discretion starts  to  exceed welfare under 
m onetary policy com m itm ent. Upon partial differentiation of the expressions for gov­
ernm ent spending, ou tput, inflation and taxation  w .r.t. the preference weights of the 
policymakers it is straightforw ard to  show also the second m ain result of the Alesina and 
Tabellini (1987) analysis: w ith  m onetary policy discretion, a more conservative mone­
tary  authority, implying a decrease in /¿i, reduces inflation, government spending and 
ou tpu t and increases taxation. In addition, if ¡ii = Si where i =  {1,2}, welfare losses are 
lower w ith a more conservative m onetary authority, whereas welfare losses can be higher 
w ith a more conservative m onetary authority  if ¡ii ^  <5*. Social welfare first increases 
w ith a more conservative m onetary au thority  th a t a ttribu tes smaller weights to  ou tpu t 
and government spending. At some values of ¡i\ and fj,2 , the positive effect from lower 
inflation, however, s tarts  to  be outweighed by the loss of seignorage th a t has to  be com­
pensated by higher taxation  which depresses ou tpu t an d /o r lowers government spending.
3. E stab lish in g  a  M o n eta ry  U n ion
From a setting w ith national autonom y in m onetary and fiscal policy design we now 
shift our a tten tion  to  a setting where bo th  countries decide to  form a m onetary union, 
the EMU. Under EMU, national currencies cease to  exist and exchange ra te  changes 
are ruled out by definition. N ational m onetary policies will be replaced by the common 
m onetary policy of the ECB. Representatives of the participating  countries will have a 
(weighted) vote in the decision m aking process inside the ECB and in this way on its 
m onetary policies5. Given our earlier assum ption in th a t goods m arkets of bo th  countries 
are highly integrated, a m onetary union implies th a t a common price level, p E , prevails 
in bo th  countries th a t grows at the common rate  of inflation. Defining the common rate 
of inflation, 7te  =  we can rewrite aggregate supply in bo th  countries as a function 
of inflation, inflation expectations of the trade unions, their real wage targets and the 
level of distortionary ou tpu t taxation  th a t the fiscal authorities choose,
y = a(TTE — (7rE )e — t  — uj) (9a)
y* =  a ( i r E  -  (7te Y* -  T *  -  u * )  . (9b)
The ECB sets the common rate  of inflation such as to  minimize its loss function 
th a t is assumed to  depend on the common rate of inflation, average output, y A , and the 
deviation of average government spending, gA , from its target level, gA ,
VE =  +  /< f  (¡/>)2 + / < f  (<r4 -  9'4) 2}  • (10)
Average output and government spending (targets) are defined as y A = -yy +  (1 —7 )2/* and 
gA =  7(7 +  (1 — 7 )(7* where 7  and 1 — 7  denote again the relative sizes of bo th  countries. 
T ha t the ECB is assumed to  care about average outpu t and average government spending 
can be understood when considering the ECB as a coalition of the former national Central 
Banks in the EU whose individual objectives are weighted by the relative country sizes, 
7  and 1 — 7 .
Under EMU the government budget constraint relates government spending to  ordi­
nary taxes plus seignorage revenues received from the ECB. Seignorage revenues of the 
ECB equal the increase of the supply of Euro(pean) base money, M E =  d]^ t . The ECB 
redistributes its seignorage revenues to  bo th  countries according to  their shares in the
5 See in  p a rticu la r A lesina an d  G rilli (1993) an d  th e  te x t o f th e  M aastrich t T rea ty  for a  m ore deta iled  
account of th e  in te rn a l decision m aking  process in  th e  E C B .
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ECB which are denoted by 9 and 1 — 96. As fractions of dom estic ou tpu t the dynamic 
government budget constraints now read,
y  y  y
cr_ _  T* | (1 - 6 ) M e
(11a)
( i ib )
Denoting again fractions of G D P by lower case variables and approxim ating ECB seignor­
age as a fraction of EU G D P by the European rate of inflation, implying th a t 7te  = 
and noting th a t EU ou tpu t Y E = Y  +  Y*  and 7  =  y%,  we rewrite (11) as,
To relate the fractions of the ECB seignorage th a t bo th  countries receive to  the size 
of their economies, we have to  scale them  down by the fractions, 7  and 1 — 7 , th a t 
measure the relative sizes of bo th  countries in the EU economy. If countries receive a 
share in ECB seignorage according to  their size, 9 equals 7  and 1 — 9 equals 1 — 7  , other 
distribution functions, however, are also conceivable7.
The m onetary policy of the ECB has bo th  a stabilization dimension as inflationary 
surprises affect ou tpu t in bo th  economies according to  (9), and also a revenue dimen­
sion as higher inflation implies higher seignorage revenues for bo th  countries, according 
to  (12). Like the (former) national m onetary authorities, the ECB may face time- 
inconsistency problems w ith the im plem entation of its m onetary policy. In the context 
of the EMU it is often argued th a t the ECB might be subject to  additional comm it­
ment problems if the no bail out provision of highly indebted countries is not credible. 
In th a t case, the ECB will be effectively forced to  monetize partly  the deficits of these 
countries such as to  prevent an EMU-wide financial crisis. To strengthen the credibility 
of no bail out of undisciplined and insolvent governments by the ECB, a high degree 
of ECB independence and the fiscal stringency criteria were pu t into the M aastricht 
Treaty. To analyze such time-inconsistency problems in EMU, we compare outcomes 
under a regime where the ECB is able to  commit its m onetary policy towards the EU 
private sector w ith outcomes under the tim e-consistent discretionary regime where it 
cannot do so. An independent ECB is more likely to  establish credibility and to  sustain 
a com m itm ent equilibrium, whereas a dependent ECB may not be able to  implement its 
m onetary policy w ith comm itm ent.
M onetary policy of the ECB is found when minimizing (10) subject to  the ou tpu t 
equations (9) and the government budget constraints (12). Fiscal policies are found 
when minimizing the respective loss functions (7) subject to  their individual ou tpu t (9) 
and government budget (12) equations. W ith  the use of these policy reaction functions, 
the equilibrium in the com m itm ent case can be w ritten  as,
eT he  P ro to co l belonging to  th e  M aastrich t T rea ty  determ ines in  A rtic le  33 th a t  seignorage of th e  
E C B  is red is tr ib u ted  to  th e  E U  countries in  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e ir  shares in  th e  E C B  cap ita l. A rtic le  29 
determ ines th e  shares of th e  E U  countries in  th e  cap ita l of th e  E C B  to  be w eighted  averages of th e  shares 
of th e  E U  countries in  to ta l E U  po p u la tio n  an d  th e  shares of th e  E U  countries in  to ta l E U  G DP.
A n exam ple m ight illu s tra te  (12). C onsider an  E U  in  w hich co un try  1 is la rger th a n  co un try  2, e.g.
7 =  I  .W hen E C B  seignorage is equally  d is trib u ted , im plying 0 =  ^ , ^  equals -| an d  y r “ , f  • Seignorage 
revenues in th a t  case are  red is tr ib u ted  from  co un try  1 to  coun try  2 because its  E C B  share is sm aller 
th a n  its  size, im plying th a t  >  1-
9
9
1 - 7
7T.E (12b)
(12a)
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Table 2a
Outcomes in a M onetary Union: M onetary Policy Com m itm ent
C ountry 1
_ S1a 2(S*a2( l + ( l - d ) li f ) + S * ) r _ , t L ^ - S i a 2lJZ s { a 2
9 - 9  = ----- ^ —  Ac 2 2,{u + g ) ------ 2---- ------------ (w* +  5 )
y = - j ^ ( 9 - g )
7T =  7TE  =  / ¿ f  (7 (<j - g )  +  ( 1 -  7 ) ( g*  -  g* ) )
T  =  - ^  +  r 1h ( 9 - g )
C ountry 2r - </ = + J.) _ fii2!(lS+s)
9* =  - ^ ( 9 * - 9 - )
_ , ,E7T* = 7T =  (7(^7 — (7) +  (1 — 7 )(i?* — g*))
r* = - ^  + J K ( g * - g * )S*a2
in which A c  =  (<5ia2 +  <52)(<5f a 2( l  +  (1 — 0 ) / t f ) +  ^2) +  S ia 29 (8 la 2 +  ¿ ijV f  • Table 
2a gives the outcomes under EMU when the ECB can commit its m onetary policy. As 
m entioned, binding agreements or reputational forces enable to  sustain the comm itm ent 
equilibrium. If such features are absent, the case arises where the ECB is unable to  
commit its m onetary policy towards the private sector. It is straightforw ard as well 
to  calculate the equilibrium w ith discretion in which the ECB fails to  commit itself. 
Solving, as before, the first-order conditions of all players we can derive the reaction 
functions of the fiscal authorities in bo th  countries and the ECB in the no-com m itment 
case. Table 2b gives the outcomes under EMU when the ECB implem ents m onetary 
policy w ith discretion,
Table 2b
Outcomes in a M onetary Union: M onetary Policy Discretion
C ountry 1
^ ¿lQ2(51*Q 2(l+(l-0)(Atf +  M g* 2 ))+'5|) _
g - g  = ------------------- p -------- ] +  9 )
i i ^ 1Q2(M f+ 4 i i ),iQ2
AD ] (^* +  9*)
y = - s ^ ( g - g )  t
7T =  tte  =  ( / i f  +  ^ ) 7 (g - g )  +  ( / i f  +  ^ ) ( 1  -  7 )(5 * -  g*) 
T  =  - ^  +  s ^ ( g - g )
C ountry 2
- *  * ¿jQ 2(5jQ2( l + 0(/ifH— ¿t^ '))+ '52) .
g - g  = ------------ p — -^------ (w* + g*)
-(uj + g)A c
y* = - j f c ( ? - g * )
TT* = irE =  ( / i f  +  ^ ) 7 (g - g )  + ( » 2  + ^ X 1 -  7 )(g* -  g*) r* = -u* + 1^{-g*-g*)_________
in which A D =  (<5ia2 +  <52)(<5J a 2( l  +  (1 — 0 )(/if  +  ^~g~)) +  d£) +  6 ia 26{6\a2 +  6%)
( /i f  +  >J'1S^2). A comparison between outcomes under ECB m onetary policy comm itm ent 
(Table 2a) and discretion (Table 2b), does not provide an unambiguous picture on the 
differences between bo th  regimes for the individual countries. From the perspective of 
the individual countries, outcomes under a m onetary union, moreover, can be compared
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w ith outcomes under national m onetary policy autonomy, by comparing Tables 1 and 2. 
It is seen th a t outcomes under a m onetary union are in principal quite different from those 
under national m onetary policy autonom y because the change from national m onetary 
policy to  a common m onetary policy affects also national fiscal policies and thereby 
ou tpu t and welfare of the individual countries. Outcomes under EMU depend not only 
on national fiscal preferences and real wage targets -like under national m onetary policy 
autonomy- bu t also on those of the foreign economy. In  addition, preferences of the ECB 
rather th an  those of the national m onetary authorities determ ine outcomes under EMU. 
An im portan t role also plays the seignorage redistribution channel th a t depends on the 
d istribution and size param eters, 9 and 7 .
Calculating EU averages, however, provides a more clear picture in case we assume 
th a t Si = 8*, i =  {1, 2}. It is straightforw ard to  show th a t in th a t case the basic results 
of the closed economy of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) apply also to  the m onetary union 
case. In  particular, EU wide inflation, average ou tpu t and average government spending 
are lower and average taxes are higher under ECB m onetary policy comm itm ent th an  
under m onetary policy discretion. Also, it is straightforw ard to  show th a t a more conser­
vative ECB -implying a decrease in ¡ i f  - reduces EU wide inflation, average ou tpu t and 
average government spending and increases average taxation  w ith discretionary mone­
tary  policy. Also, from an initial position where ¡ i f  = Si =  S*, i =  {1, 2}, average welfare 
losses are lower w ith a more conservative m onetary authority, Welfare losses, however, 
can be higher w ith a more conservative m onetary authority  in an initial position where 
f i f  ^  Si = 8*, i =  {1, 2}. A more conservative ECB implies lower inflation and therefore 
higher average taxes and lower average output and average government spending under 
EMU. From an initial position where ¡ i f  = Si = 8*, i =  {1, 2}, the positive welfare ef­
fects from lower inflation exceed the welfare costs from lower average ou tpu t and average 
government spending. W hen decreasing , however, a t some point the balance reverses 
and a more conservative ECB starts  to  deteriorate average welfare in the EU. Therefore, 
the basic results of the closed economy analysis of Alesina and Tabellini also apply to  a 
m onetary union when we consider average government spending, ou tput, taxation  and 
welfare.
4. F isca l F ederalism  in  th e  E M U
A growing degree of harm onization of tax  rates and tax  systems has been achieved 
in the EU and it is likely th a t in the future issues of fiscal federalism will become more 
im portan t and pressing. In  particular, the question has to  be addressed to which extent 
control over taxation  and government spending will be centralized at the federal EU 
level ra ther th an  at a national and regional level as currently. The argum ents from the 
theory of fiscal federalism indicate th a t a higher degree of centralization of taxation  and 
government spending th an  is currently seen in the EU is likely to  be efficient because 
of im portant externalities and economies of scale and scope in raising tax  revenues and 
providing public goods. At present the EU budget only represents 1.2% of the EU GDP 
whereas the federal budget in existing m onetary unions (e.g. U nited States, Canada, 
Switzerland and Germany) am ounts to  30 to  40% of GDP. A federal EU budget will per­
form three im portant functions: an allocative function, a redistributional function and 
a stabilization function. Currently, a large share of the EU budget is devoted to  control 
allocation in the agricultural sector. The rem ainder of the budget is largely directed to  
the EU Structural Funds which are redistributive grant mechanisms designed to  foster 
convergence and cohesion in the EU. Their redistributive power is currently fairly lim ited 
because of their small size and a further increase in the EU budget will be necessary to  
foster real convergence in the EU. In addition, a more substantial EU budget will in­
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crease the im portance of the EU budget as an autom atic stabilizer of asym m etric shocks 
in the EMU, a role which is virtually  absent currently8.
If the EU evolves into a true  federation, the European Union institutions control the 
European tax  system  and government spending. In an -adm ittedly- simplified m anner, 
fiscal federalism can be analyzed in our simple model by introducing a European Fiscal 
A uthority  (EFA ) 9 th a t chooses a common ou tpu t tax, t e  , and redistributes the revenues 
from this common outpu t tax  to  the two national fiscal authorities in a proportion 
{4>, 1 — 0}. Under EMU and federal fiscal policies in the EU, a country receives, therefore, 
a share from the federal tax  revenues, T E , and a share from the seignorage revenues of 
the ECB. As fractions of ou tpu t the government budget constraints under m onetary and 
fiscal unification in the EU become,
G (f)TE 9M e  . .
Y  =  V  +  —  <13“ >
(r_ =  (1 - a )t e ( i  - o)m e
Y * y * Y* '
Denoting again fractions of G D P by lower case variables and approxim ating ECB seignor­
age as a fraction of EU G D P by the European rate  of inflation, we can rewrite (13) as,
g =  — t e  -|— 7te  (14a)
g- =  +  (14b)
1 — 7  1 — 7
where t e  =  W ith  tax  rates being determ ined by the EU rather th an  national fiscal 
authorities, ou tput (9) changes to,
y  = a(TTE — (TTE )e — t e  — uj) (15a)
y*  = a(TTE — (TTE )e* — t e  — uj*) . (15b)
Similar to  the case of the ECB, it is assumed th a t the federal fiscal au thority  seeks 
to  minimize its loss function which is a function of inflation, average ou tpu t and average 
government spending in the EU,
minrBUB =  \ { { ^ E f  + S f ( y A)2 + SE (gA -  gA f }  , (16)
in which 6e  and 6E denote the relative weights th a t the common fiscal au thority  attaches 
to  reducing the ou tpu t gap of the EU economy and the level of government spending 
in the EU, respectively. W ith  the m onetary policies of the ECB still resulting from 
minimizing its loss function in (10) -now subject to  (14) and (15), we can derive outcomes 
under a regime of com m itm ent of the ECB its m onetary policy,
8See in  p a rticu la r E u ro p ean  C om m ission (1993) a n d  C E P R  (1993) for a  m uch m ore d e ta iled  account 
of th e  m any issues in  fiscal federalism  in  th e  EU.
9 M uch like th e  E C B  m ight be looked u p o n  as a  coalition  o f th e  (form er) n a tio n a l m o n e ta ry  au th o rities
th a t  coo rd inate  an d  im plem ent a  com m on m o n e ta ry  policy, th is  E u ro p ean  F iscal A u th o rity  m ight be
looked up o n  as a  coalition  of th e  n a tio n a l fiscal au th o ritie s  th a t  design a  com m on fiscal policy. In  th a t
perspective, it m igh t be sim ilar to  th e  cu rrenc t E C O F IN  in  w hich th e  m in isters of finance a n d  econom ic
affairs of th e  E U  countries regularly  m eet to  coo rd inate  fiscal an d  econom ic policies. Like in  th e  case of 
th e  E C B , th e  u ltim a te  policies of th e  EFA  are  likely to  involve an  in trica te  bargain ing  process betw een 
th e  E U  countries.
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Table 3a
Outcomes in a M onetary Union and Fiscal Union: M onetary Policy Com m itment
C ountry 1
9-9= ^  + +
y  =  a (  1 -  7 )(w* -  w) -  ^ (7( 5  -  g )  +  (1 -  7 )(5 * -  5 *))
7T =  7TE  =  / i f  (7( 5  -  5 ) +  (1 -  7 ) (5 * -  g* ) )
T  =  T E  =  - ( 7 w +  (1 -  7 )w*) +  ^ 2  (7(5  -  5 ) +  (1 -  7 )(5* -  5*)) 
C ountry 2
a* _  g * — s f a 2{ i+e^ )+ 4> s^  , 7( i _ 0) , _  , ,
5  5  “ ¿ f a 2(l+(u f  ) + « £   ^ I - 7  W  ^  +  S' i
^ ( t f f  a 2( l - l % ? + ( l - 0 )tf2 ) (1 - 7 )0 .-.* , =*\
“ ¿ f a 2(l+(u f ) + i f  7  W  + 5 ')
y * =  -  w) -  ^ (7 (5  -  5 ) +  (1 -  7 ) ( r  -  5*))
TT* = 7 T E  =  / i f  (7(5 -  5) +  (1 -  7 ) (5* -  5*))
T* = t e  =  - ( 7w +  (1 -  7)w*) +  ¿ 2  (7( 5  -  5 ) +  (1 -  7)(5* -  5*))
Similarly, we can also calculate the outcomes in a m onetary and fiscal union in case 
the ECB implements the common m onetary policy w ith discretion,
Table 3b
Outcomes in a M onetary and Fiscal Union: M onetary Policy Discretion
C ountry 1
i f  Q2(l + ( l - 0)(/lf+Ml B2 ))+(l-<f>)gf
9 - 9  =  ----------------------------+  9 )
S f  a 2( l + n f  +  I g 2 )+ S f  
1
a 2e(Atf+ ^ | 2- ) + ^ f )
--------------------- ( i - 7 w +  (1 “  (t))ljJ* +  9*)
S f a 2( l +^  + ^ )+S f  7
y  =  a ( l  -  7 )(w* -  u )  -  ^ 2  (7 ( 5  -  5 ) +  (1 -  7 ) ( 5 * -  5* ))
TT =  7rB =  ( /i f  +  £j J 2-)(7 (5 -  5 ) +  (1 -  7)(5* -  5*))
t  =  t e  =  - ( 7 a; +  (1 -  7 )w*) +  ^ 2  (7(5 -  5) +  (1 -  7)(5* -  9*)) 
C ountry 2
i f Q2( l + 0(M?  +  ^ 2- ) ) + ^ ?
-  9* = ------------------ +  (1 -  +  r )¿fa2(l+Atf + ^)+if 7
1
Y ^ ( g f  a 2( l - e ) ( ^ f +  M lJ 2 )+(l-0)gf)
¿ f a 2( l +Atf  +  4 # ) + i f  
£
y*  =  _ a 7 (^ *  _  _  ^ ( 7(5 -  g )  +  (1 -  7 ) ( g*  -  g* ) )
IT* = i r E  =  ( / i f  +  £i^ ) ( 7 (5 -  5 ) +  (1 -  7 ) ( g*  -  9* ) )
t * = t e  =  - ( 7  Q  +  (1 -  7 )w*) +  ¿ 2(7  (5 -  5) +  (1 -  7)(5* -  5*))
A m onetary union implies th a t a country can no longer control its inflation rate  
bu t instead adopts the common rate  of inflation as determ ined by the ECB. Moreover, 
seignorage redistribution occurs if the ECB seignorage is not redistributed proportional
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to  the size of the countries th a t form the m onetary union. A m onetary and fiscal union 
implies th a t a country also has no longer control over its ra te  of ou tpu t taxation  but 
instead adopts a common tax  ra te  th a t is set by the federal fiscal authority. In  addition, 
fiscal revenues are redistributed if the revenue distribution is not proportional to  the 
size of the countries th a t form the m onetary union. Clearly, the instrum ent of fiscal 
redistribution is a very powerful instrum ent in the hands of the federal fiscal authority  
to  pursue its fiscal policy objectives and has a direct effect on macroeconomic outcomes 
under EMU.
A m onetary union and in particular a m onetary union plus fiscal union imply a much 
more complicated interaction between bo th  countries as com pared to  the case w ith na­
tional m onetary policy autonom y in section 2. This witnesses e.g. the fact th a t we are no 
longer able to  sign unambiguously the partial derivatives of the various variables w .r.t. 
the model param eters w ithout imposing further restrictions. Under EMU we find th a t 
com pared w ith  national m onetary policy autonomy, not only changes in the domestic 
real wage and government spending target affect domestic outcomes but also changes 
in the foreign targets affect the dom estic economy. These spillovers result under EMU 
because m onetary policy of the ECB reacts changes in bo th  dom estic and foreign targets. 
Therefore, seignorage revenues are affected and by th a t taxation, government spending 
and ou tpu t in both  countries. This interaction of m onetary and fiscal policies in the 
EU is further intensified in a m onetary and fiscal union. There, not only the common 
m onetary policy reacts to  domestic and foreign wage and government spending targets 
bu t so does the common fiscal policy.
5. S tru ctu ra l A sy m m etr ie s  an d  T h eir  C on seq u en ces on  E M U
It is interesting to  compare the three institu tional configurations th a t were considered 
in section 2 -the pre-EM U situation w ith national m onetary policy autonomy, or al­
ternatively a two-speed m onetary union-, section 3 -a m onetary union w ith national 
fiscal policy autonomy- and section 4 -bo th  a m onetary and fiscal union in the EU­
. In  particular, we like to  compare the outcomes of these regimes in the presence of 
s tructural asymmetries between the EU countries since the EU countries are currently 
far from homogeneous regarding economic structure, macroeconomic performance and 
policy preferences. These structural asymmetries are likely to  show some degree of per­
sistence in the transition  towards a full m onetary union in Europe, moreover. Here, 
we focus on the effects of two im portan t asymmetries th a t could exist between the two 
countries th a t participate in the EMU: (i) differences in the com m itm ent ability of their 
national m onetary authorities, (ii) differences in fiscal preferences. The first asym m etry 
is of crucial im portance when a m onetary union is formed, the second when a m onetary 
and fiscal union is introduced.
Consider the form ation of a m onetary union between country 1 and 2 in a situation 
where the m onetary authorities of country 1 are able to  credibly commit their m onetary 
policies towards the private sector whereas the m onetary authorities in country 2 are 
not. As such, country 1 could represent a group of ’core’ countries around Germany th a t 
have established a strong low inflation comm itm ent in their m onetary policies whereas 
country 2 could represent the group of ’peripheral’ M editerranean countries th a t have 
a less solid low inflation reputation. Consequently, w ith national m onetary policy au­
tonomy, country 2 features a higher inflation ra te  th an  country 1. Therefore, it relies 
relatively more on seignorage revenues and relatively less on ordinary taxes to  finance 
government spending th an  country l 10. From such an initial situation it is interesting
10I t  is indeed often  argued  th a t  a  ‘tw o-speed’ m o n e ta ry  un ion  is p referable for th e  p eriphera l S outhern  
E u ro p ean  countries. For these countries it  is efficient to  rely  re la tively  m ore on  seignorage revenues
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to  study the effects for bo th  countries from entering a m onetary union. This asym m etry 
in com m itm ent ability of the national m onetary authorities can best be analyzed from 
an initial setting where the countries are symm etric in all o ther respects. Otherwise, the 
analysis is blurred by the effects of other differences between bo th  countries. Also, the 
expressions become increasingly difficult to  handle if more asymmetries are analyzed at 
the same tim e and the effects when moving from national m onetary policy autonom y to 
a m onetary union in th a t case can take any direction in principle. Therefore, we impose 
the following symm etry conditions: S\ =  =  ^2 ^ 1  =  A*! =  ■> I12 =  ^2 =  1^2’
uj =  u)*,g = g* and 0 =  7 , implying th a t policy weights, government spending targets 
and real wage targets coincide and th a t ECB seignorage is redisitributed according to  
the size of the EU countries.
For country 1 it is in particular interesting to  compare outcomes under national 
m onetary policy com m itm ent w ith outcomes under a m onetary union where the ECB 
implements the common m onetary policy w ith discretion. It is indeed often asserted 
and feared in Germany th a t the ECB may suffer from com m itm ent problems and will 
not have the high anti-inflation credibility of the Bundesbank. From the perspective of 
country 2, on the other hand, it is particularly  interesting to  analyze how it is affected 
when it enters a m onetary union w ith an ECB th a t can implement the common m onetary 
policy w ith comm itm ent. It is straightforw ard11 from Tables 1 and 2 to  calculate in bo th  
cases the effects when moving from national m onetary policy autonom y to  a m onetary 
union for country 1 under the assum ption th a t its (former) national m onetary authority  
was able to  implement its m onetary policy w ith com m itm ent whereas the ECB fails to  
do so and relies on discretionary m onetary policies. A m onetary union w ith discretionary 
m onetary policies of the ECB results in higher inflation in country 1, which is welfare 
deteriorating, bu t also in lower taxes, higher ou tpu t and higher government spending 
which are welfare improving. The net welfare effect is, therefore, ambiguous. In this 
particular setting of otherwise sym m etric countries, the effects for country 2 moving 
from a setting  w ith national m onetary policy discretion to  an EMU in which the ECB 
implements the common m onetary policy w ith com m itm ent are exactly opposite to  those 
of country 1 moving from national m onetary com m itm ent to  a m onetary union w ith 
m onetary policy discretion of the ECB. Therefore, government spending, ou tput and 
inflation will all be lower in country 2 after entering the m onetary union, taxation  will 
be higher and the net welfare gain also ambiguous. The asym m etry in the ability w ith 
which their national m onetary authorities can commit the m onetary policies towards 
the private sector is seen to  have asym m etric effects on bo th  countries when entering a 
m onetary union.
A second asym m etry we are interested in are differences in fiscal structures. The fis­
cal structure of bo th  countries is summ arized by the fiscal targets and preference weights 
{g, g*, Si, <5*}. Differences in these fiscal structures are im portant bo th  when a m onetary 
union is established and also when in addition fiscal unification is carried out in the EU. 
F irst, we consider the form ation of a m onetary union between the two countries which 
are assumed to  be sym m etric in all respects, except th a t country 2 has a higher govern­
ment spending target, implying th a t S\ =  <$J,<$2 =  ^2 ^ 1  =  I11 =  I1 f i  ¿¿2 = ^ 2  =  1^2’ 
uj =  uj* , 0 =  7  and g <  g*. Assume, moreover, th a t bo th  countries do not differ in their 
com m itm ent ability towards the private sector and th a t the ECB also features the same 
com m itm ent ability as the former national m onetary authorities. It is straightforw ard to  
calculate the effects of this second asym m etry when EMU is implemented. The higher 
government spending target of country 2, implies more inflationary policies of the ECB.
an d  relatively  less on o rd in ary  ta x a tio n  according to  th e  princip les of op tim al ta x a tio n  because of th e ir 
re latively  inefficient a n d  d is to rtio n a ry  ta x  system  as com pared  to  th e  core E U  countries. See in  p a rticu la r 
C anzoneri a n d  R ogers (1990) on th is  ‘op tim al ta x a tio n ’ argum en t for a  ‘tw o-speed’ EM U .
11 D etails of all calcu lations in  th is  p ap e r are  available for th e  in te res ted  reader up o n  request.
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Therefore, inflation in country 1 is higher after entering the EMU. W ith  the propor­
tional redistribution of ECB seigniorage, country 1 then  has more seignorage revenues 
th an  under national m onetary policy autonomy. This enables an increase in government 
spending and a lowering of tax  revenues which increases ou tpu t on its tu rn . The effects of 
the differences in government spending targets are -besides other param eters- a function 
of the size param eter 7 : if 7  gets larger, the im portance of country 1 in the EU increases 
and the effects from entering a m onetary union w ith country 2 th a t has a higher gov­
ernm ent spending target decrease. Its larger size implies th a t its own preferences have 
a larger influence in the design of ECB m onetary policy.
In  case EMU evolves from a m onetary union to  a m onetary and fiscal union, the pref­
erence weights of the federal fiscal authority  determ ine the outcomes, ra ther 
th an  the national preference weights. A th ird  asym m etry can therefore be identified if 
the fiscal preferences differ. Therefore, it is interesting to  explore how the preference 
weights of the national and federal fiscal authorities affect outcomes under EMU. In par­
ticular, we assume th a t bo th  countries are symm etric except th a t the fiscal authorities 
in country 2 a ttach  a higher weight to  government expenditure stabilization th an  the 
fiscal authorities in country 1. Moreover, we assume th a t the common fiscal authority  
features the same weight to  government spending as the fiscal authority  of country 2 . 
Therefore, we consider the case where <$1 =  ¡i\ =  ¡i\ =  ¡ i f , ¡12 =  A*2 = ^  1 
uj = u *, 6 =  7  =  (f), g =  g* and 6% = 6% >  <$2- It is im portant to  realize th a t in this 
case, countries receive a proportional share in seignorage and tax  revenues under fiscal 
union and there is no effective redistribution of seignorage and tax  revenues12. A com­
parison between an EMU w ith national fiscal autonom y and an EMU th a t features also 
a fiscal union, then  provides us w ith insight how fiscal unification could affect outcomes 
in bo th  countries. It is relatively straightforw ard to  calculate the effects on government 
spending, taxation, ou tpu t and inflation in bo th  countries from fiscal unification in this 
case. The effects are unambiguous and of the same direction bo th  w ith and w ithout com­
m itm ent in the design of the common m onetary policy by the ECB. The effects are of 
course strongest for country 1: under a fiscal union, taxes and government spending un­
ambiguously increase and outpu t declines com pared to  a m onetary union w ith national 
fiscal autonomy. This is because now relatively more weight is a ttached  to  government 
spending in country 1 then  before under national fiscal autonomy. An interesting indi­
rect effect is provoked: the ECB sets a lower rate  of inflation as it reacts to  the higher 
weight in the fiscal player(s) objective functions th a t is now attached  to  government 
spending in country 1. The lower inflation under fiscal union has a negative side ef­
fect as bo th  countries will have less seignorage revenues available to  cover government 
spending th an  before under m onetary union w ith national fiscal autonomy. As a result 
of this secondary effect also country 2 is affected: government spending declines, taxes 
increase and output decreases in country 2 to  make up for the loss in seignorage revenues.
C on clu sion s
This paper studied the effects of m onetary and fiscal unification in the European Union 
in the context of a highly stylized model on the interaction of m onetary and fiscal policy, 
proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (1987). The model was extended to  a two-country 
m onetary union in which a common central bank, the ECB, determ ines the common 
m onetary policy. An im portant aspect th a t was studied, concerned the implications 
of w hether or not the ECB could commit its m onetary policy towards the EU private 
sector. The possibility to  extend EMU to  a fiscal union was considered. Undoubtedly, 
fiscal federalism issues will become increasingly im portan t w ith proceeding of economic
12W ith o u t th is  asu m p tio n  th e  effects on b o th  countries from  fiscal un ification  can  take any  direction .
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and political integration and m onetary unification as entailed by EMU. A stylized in­
terp reta tion  of the fiscal federalism issues was considered by introducing a federal fiscal 
authority  in the EU th a t operates a European tax  system  and redistributes the proceeds 
to  the individual countries, -or regions if one likes-. In  an EMU th a t also features fiscal 
union, bo th  seignorage and fiscal redistribution are seen to  affect macroeconomic out­
comes. Two possible asymm etries between EU countries were studied: (i) differences 
in the comm itm ent ability of the national m onetary authorities and (ii) differences in 
fiscal structures. It was shown how the first asym m etry affects bo th  countries when 
they enter a m onetary union where the ECB differs in com m itm ent (in)ability from the 
(former) national m onetary authorities. The second asym m etry proves to  be im portant 
bo th  when the m onetary union is entered and when the m onetary union is complemented 
by a fiscal union in which taxation  is centralized. If the federal fiscal authority  features 
different preference weights th an  the national fiscal authorities it will set a common tax  
ra te  th a t is (possibly much) different from the optim al national tax  rates w ith all the 
consequences for ou tpu t and government spending in the EU countries.
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